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By conductinga nationalsurvey, thisArticle empirically assesses how
American police leadersperceive external legal regulation.
At various times, policymakers have decried external police regulations as too expensive, too complicated, or too difficult to apply to different
factual scenarios. Criticshave also alleged thatpolice regulationschange
too frequently, inadequatelyconsider inputfrom the law enforcement community, and unduly risk the safety of officers or the broadercommunity.
These complaints underscorean uncomfortable but unavoidable reality: efforts to regulatepolice behavior often requirepolicymakers to make
compromises. A rule thatpromotes one goal may necessarily compromise
anotherimportantgoal. So, what do police leaders actually care about most
when faced with external legal regulation? To answer this question, this
Article relies on a datasetof489 survey responses collectedfrom a random
sample of law enforcement leaders across the country. With the help of a
multidimensional preference-scaling model, this Article shows that the
chiefconcern ofpolice leaders is how external legal regulationsimpair the
safety of officers and the public. Respondents rated the protection of constitutional rights and the prevention of crime as the second and third most
important values. And, contrary to assumptions made by many policymakers, police leaders ranked cost, predictability,and consistency as relatively
unimportantconsiderations.
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INTRODUCTION

Soon after President Donald J. Trump took office, U.S. Attorney General
Jeff Sessions released a short memorandum announcing a dramatic shift in the
Department of Justice's ("DOJ") approach to reforming American police departments.' The DOJ memorandum stated that "[i]t is not the responsibility of the
federal government to manage non-federal law enforcement agencies[j" and it
argued that "[t]he misdeeds of individual bad actors should not impugn or undermine the legitimate and honorable work that law enforcement officers and
agencies perform in keeping American communities safe." 2 Attorney General
1. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, for Heads of Department Components and United
States Attorneys (Mar. 31, 2017) (on file with author).
2. Id. at 1-2.
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Sessions then signaled that the DOJ would no longer utilize its authority to oversee problematic police departments, out of fear that such regulation puts at risk
the "safety and protection of the public" and the safety of police officers who
"perform uniquely dangerous tasks."3
While politically contentious, Attorney General Sessions's concern about
the link between police regulation and public safety echoes similar sentiments
expressed by other law enforcement leaders. Perhaps most notably, James B.
Comey, then Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, told a group of
law students at the University of Chicago that law enforcement officers might be
reluctant to police the streets proactively because many feel "under siege." 4 In
the era of increased oversight and regulation, Director Comey worried that there
is a "chill wind blowing through American law enforcement" that may be
"changing behavior."'
Attorney General Sessions and Director Comey are not alone. Since the
onset of the criminal procedure revolution of the mid-twentieth century, critics
have worried that external regulations of police officers come with significant
costs or unexpected side effects. At various times, police leaders have decried
external regulations as too expensive, too complicated, or too difficult to apply
to different factual scenarios. Critics have also alleged that police regulations
change too frequently or inadequately consider input from the law enforcement
community. But perhaps the most common critique of police regulation is that it
unduly risks the safety of officers or the broader community.
These complaints underscore an uncomfortable but unavoidable reality: efforts to combat police misconduct may require policymakers to make trade-offs
and compromises. For example, rules that provide for the robust oversight or
investigation of alleged police misconduct may lead to increased costs for local
taxpayers. Similarly, rules that require officers to make nuanced, fact-specific
judgments about how to apply the law to different circumstances may sacrifice
the simplicity of a bright-line rule. It is often impossible for courts or legislators
to craft police regulations without explicitly or implicitly making such trade-offs.
Of course, this observation is not unique to policing. In virtually all fields, regulatory "perfection is unattainable." 6 As previous scholars have recognized,

3. Id. at 2 (adding further that this approach can help local departments "focus on making law enforcement a rewarding career, and attracting and retaining well-qualified personnel."); see also Jeff Sessions, Avoid
Harmful Federal Intrusion, USA TODAY (April 17, 2017, 6:02 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/04/17/jeff-sessions-avoid-harmful-federal-intrusion-editorials-debates/100579848 (citing falling arrest
rates and increasing crime rates in Chicago and Baltimore to, in part, justify the federal government pulling back
enforcement of § 14141 in those communities).
4. James B. Comey, FBI Dir., Law Enforcement and the Communities We Serve: Bending Toward Safety
and Justice, Remarks at the University of Chicago Law School (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/
speeches/law-enforcement-and-the-communities-we-serve-bending-the-lines-toward-safety-and-justice.

5.

Id.

6.

Lawrence Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CALiF. L. REv. 181, 185 (2004).
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"[d]rafting, amending, and interpreting procedural rules requires prioritizing
some . . . values over others." 7
This raises an empirical question. What values should we care about most
when regulating police behavior? While there is a considerable and growing
body of literature on the regulation of police misconduct, and there is a significant amount of scholarship about the comparative importance of competing values in other regulatory contexts, there is a dearth of literature examining the comparative importance of competing values in police regulation. Answering this
question is particularly important today. Since the events in Ferguson, Missouri
in 2014, there has been renewed national interest in-and pushback againstpolice reform. Scholars have been quick to offer a wide range of solutions to the
problem of police misconduct in the United States. But in order to develop the
most effective police regulations, it is important to first understand the relative
importance of the competing values at stake during such regulation.
Of course, no single study could claim to definitively determine which values are most important during police regulation. The prioritization of competing
values requires policymakers to make normative choices. These choices are
driven by political, moral, and practical considerations. Instead, this paper makes
a narrower but nevertheless important contribution to this discussion. By conducting a national survey, this Article empirically assesses how American police
leaders perceive external legal regulation. There is widespread agreement in the
policing literature that successful reform efforts require buy-in from both police
leadership and rank-and-file officers. Thus, if courts, legislators, and community
activists hope to bring about successful and sustainable reform in American police departments, it is important to understand the opinions of police.
So, what do police care about most when faced with external legal regulation? To answer this question, this Article relies on an original dataset of 489
survey responses collected from a random sample of law enforcement leaders
across the country. Survey respondents come from forty-nine states and represent
a demographically and geographically diverse cross-section of the American law
enforcement community. We developed our survey instrument by examining the
existing literature on police regulation. In doing so, we identified eight important
values frequently cited by advocates and critics of police regulation: (1) citizens'
rights, defined as the extent to which rules protect citizens from potentially harmful police conduct; (2) consistency, defined as the extent to which rules established in the past remain in place over time; (3) cost, defined as the extent to
which it is not too costly for a police department to comply with rules; (4) efficacy, defined as the extent to which rule promote effective crime detection and
prevention; (5) participation,defined as the extent to which rules were developed
with input from the law enforcement community; (6) predictability, defined as

7.
8.

Roger Michalski, The Clash ofProceduralValues, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 61, 69 (2018).
See id at 4-5, 11, 12 n.45.
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the extent to which officers can predict how courts will apply the rules in different situations in the future; (7) safety, defined as the extent to which officers can
abide by the rules without unduly reducing their own safety or the safety of others; and (8) simplicity, defined as the extent to which the rules are simple to understand and establish clear standards.
The existing literature suggests that each of these eight procedural values
is an important consideration during the course of external police regulation. Our
survey instrument asked law enforcement leaders to rank these values from most
to least important. Using a multidimensional preference-scaling model,9 we
show that police leaders are most concerned about how external legal regulations
impair the safety of their officers and the public. A strong majority of respondents-regardless of geographic location, department size, or other demographic
characteristics-believe that safety is the most important value at stake when
regulating police behavior. Respondents rated the protection of citizens' rights
as the second most important value, just ahead of crime prevention. And perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, respondents ranked values like cost, consistency, and
predictability at or near the bottom in comparative importance, behind other values like participation and simplicity. As we explain, these findings have important implications for the regulation of American police departments.
We have divided this paper into four parts. Part I discusses the existing
literature on procedural values, and it explores a number of values that policymakers cite as particularly important when the law oversees police behavior. Part
II discusses our methodology. Part III walks through the results of our study.
Finally, Part IV considers the implications of our findings.
II.

PROCEDURAL VALUES IN POLICING

As various scholars have previously argued, "drafting, amending, and interpreting rules requires prioritizing some . . . values over others." 10 Common
sense tells us that regulation and rule-making require policymakers to make
tough choices and trade-offs. But much of the existing literature on the prioritization of procedural values during rulemaking and regulation has focused on the
civil justice system." For example, in the civil system, scholars have observed

9. Multidimensional scaling has been used effectively in other disciplines to analyze these sorts of questions. See, e.g., TREVOR F. Cox & MICHAEL A.A. Cox, MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING (2d ed. 2001); INGWER
BORG & PATRICK GROENEN, MODERN MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 2005).

For an example of multidimensional scaling used effectively in legal scholarship, see Stephen LaTour et al.,
Procedure:TransnationalPerspectivesand Preferences, 86 YALE L.J. 258 (1976) (using multidimensional scaling to evaluate participants' opinions on twelve different model procedures).
10. Michalski, supra note 7, at 69.
11. Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281,
300 (1989) (stating that "[Rule l] was and is the expression of an ideal; certainly no one would claim that the
Federal Rules of Civil procedure have achieved such a purpose."); Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective OrderLitigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1983) (emphasizing the "central goal of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure articulated in rule 1"); Michalski, supra note 7, at 69-70; Judith Resnick, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L.
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that some stakeholders prefer rules that advance adjudication on the merits regardless of cost,12 while others may prefer rules that save time, limit expenses,
or protect the litigants' privacy.13 These value choices have consequences, as
they "radically alter[] the nature, feel, and mechanics of litigation" in the civil
system. 14 Scholars studying criminal law and procedure, like Professor Herbert
Packer, have made similar observations about the importance of procedure values.15

In the years since Professor Packer's seminal article, criminal law scholars
have frequently cited the value trade-offs implicit in many criminal justice rules
and regulations.16 The regulation of police behavior is no different. As discussed
in more detail in the next Section, courts and policymakers have frequently cited
the clash of procedural values at stake in police oversight.

REv. 837, 842 (1984) ("The relative weight assigned to these features determine the makeup ofprocedural models
and of the structure for court decision-making.").
12. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1032
(1975) ("Our adversary system rates truth too low").
13. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution ofProcedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
306, 321 (1986) ("Nourishing the fiction that justice is a pearl beyond price has its own price."); Louis Kaplow,
Information and the Aim ofAdjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (2015) ("Nontrivial system costs must usually be incurred to obtain even an approximation of the truth. Attempting to move
closer is increasingly costly, and perfect truth is unobtainable.").
14. Michalski, supra note 7, at 71.
15. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
16. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, DEFINING CRIMES (3d ed. 2017).
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Frequently Cited ProceduralValues in PoliceRegulation

Much of the external regulation of police behavior is done with the goal of
protecting the public's constitutional rights under the First,' 7 Fourth," Fifth,19
and Eighth Amendments. 2 0 But efforts to protect these fundamental rights are
not costless. For example, efforts to protect citizens from unreasonable uses-offorce by law enforcement in violation of the Fourth Amendment may, in the process, establish rules that rank-and-file officers believe impair their safety. 21 Attempts to protect criminal suspects' privilege against self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment may require officers to read officers a set prophylactic, or Miranda rights, that critics claim decreases police clearance rates and increase

17. Police may violate the First Amendment by punishing someone for engaging in protected conduct, like
recording public police activities or talking back to a police officer. See, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION
OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 24 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opalpress-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/fergusonpolice departmentreportpdf; see also Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922
F.2d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1990) (striking down an arrest of a woman for disorderly conduct for calling a police
officer an "asshole" and further explaining that an offer should exercise more restraint than the typical person).
Additionally, police may violate the First Amendment by policing protests in a way that prevents members of
the public from exercising their right to protest. See generally Clark McPhail et al., PolicingProtestin the United
States: 1960-65, in POLICING PROTEST: THE CONTROL OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

51 (Donatella Della Porta & Herbert Reiter eds., 1998) (describing how police have policed the public's right to
protest in the United States).
18. Police misconduct may violate the Fourth Amendment in several ways. First, police may engage in an
unlawful search in violation of a person's reasonable expectation to privacy. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Police need
probable cause if they are to execute a search or arrest. Probable cause requires proof of "individualized suspicion

of wrongdoing." City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,37 (2000). Conversely, if an officer lacks probable
cause, the Fourth Amendment still permits limited detainment when an officer has reasonable suspicion to belief
that a person may be engaged in a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Second, police may engage in an
unlawful seizure, like an unlawful arrest or officer use-of-force. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)
(holding that use of force by police during an arrest or stop should be judged under the Fourth Amendment to
determine whether the action constituted an "unreasonable" seizure); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)
(holding that a police officer can only use deadly force against a fleeing suspect under the Fourth Amendment if
the officer believes that the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety or others).
19. Police may violate the Fifth Amendment by failing to notify a suspect of his or her privilege against
self-incrimination before engaging in custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
Police may also violate the Fifth Amendment in conducting certain lineup procedures, like failing to notify a
suspect's attorney before conducting a lineup. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
20. Generally, the Eighth Amendment applies to punishment rather than actions by police officers. But
some actions by police, like arresting individuals for so-called status crimes, may contribute unconstitutional
behavior. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a California statute criminalizing the
status of being a drug addict to be an unconstitutional criminalization of status); see also Stephen Rushin & Jenny
Carroll, Bathroom Laws as Status Crimes, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2017) (arguing that police enforcement of
bathroom prohibitions against trans people as criminal trespass may constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
21. See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-Escalate,N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/long-taught-to-use-force-police-warily-learnto-de-escalate.html (explaining how "hesitation might end up" getting an officer "killed or assaulted" and explaining that regulation of police may lead to hesitation).
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crime rates.22 And efforts to impose new oversight on police behavior may come
with a high price tag.
The Subsections that follow discuss many of the most frequently cited procedural values at stake during police regulation. This list of values is by no means
exhaustive. But each of these procedural values has received considerable attention during previous attempts to oversee police conduct. And, as we argue, regulation of police conduct designed to protect citizens' rights may necessarily require some compromise in each of these areas.
1.

Cost

Policymakers and police leaders often claim that regulations impose significant, and sometimes unreasonable, costs on local governments. Conversely,
supporters of police reform often argue that the failure to address police misconduct is itself unreasonably costly, as it exposes the municipality to civil liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In either event, cost is clearly an important consideration
when adopting police regulations.
There are, no doubt, many examples to choose from to illustrate this point.
We will, however, discuss only a handful of prominent examples. First, efforts
to install significant oversight and reform in local police departments face an
uphill battle because of the high initial costs they impose on municipal budgets.
Take, as an example, communities targeted by the federal government pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 14141 because of a "pattern or practice" of unconstitutional misconduct. 23 Section 14141 settlement agreements can be extensive, requiring police departments to make significant changes in policies, training procedures, and
oversight mechanisms. 24 While this reform mechanism has proven to be among
the most successful at encouraging constitutional policing, 2 5 it does not come
cheap. In large communities like Los Angeles, the price tag of police reform has

22. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1063-66 (1998) (linking Miranda to
decreased clearance rates in the United States).
23. For a more detailed explanation of the history of this statute, see STEPHEN RUSHIN, FEDERAL
INTERVENTION IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 67-86 (2017) (providing a detailed description of the historical events that led the statute's passage, describing the legislative history of the statute, and outlining its initial
importance).
24. Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV.
1343, 1378-87 (2015) (providing a breakdown of some of the most common components of federal consent
decrees and memorandums of agreement pursuant to § 14141).
25. See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN
LOCAL POLICING? THE PITTSBURGH CONSENT DECREE 10-11 (2005), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-webassets/downloads/Publications/can-federal-intervention-bring-lasting-improvement-in-local-policing-the-pittsburgh-consent-decree/legacydownloads/277_530.pdf (showing some of the improvements made by the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police); CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING Los ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE

DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD (2009), http://www.assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdflHarvardLAPD%20Study.pdf (showing some of the improvements made by the LAPD under federal oversight).
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run over $100 million,2 6 and tens of millions of dollars in other communities.27
In some cases, the cost of police reform has forced communities to raise taxes or
to cut resources from other worthy municipal causes like schools, parks, and infrastructure. 28 Of course, reform under § 14141 is perhaps the most extreme example, since it typically involves dramatic overhauls to department policies and
the hiring of an external monitoring team. But even less expansive reforms aimed
at curbing officer misconduct, like the installation of body-worn cameras or the
implementation of discrete training programs, can impose serious and politically
contentious costs on localities.29
Second, while police reform can be expensive, so too can the failure to address police misconduct. The failure to install adequate oversight can impose
significant costs on municipalities, as they can face liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 .30 For example, one study estimated that the City of Chicago has paid out
over $280 million in damages for civil rights violations by their officers and over
$500 million in the last decade.31 In sum, cost appears to be a point of contention
during police regulation. Supporters of constitutional policing regulations often
argue that such measures will drive down costs by limiting civil exposure under
§ 1983, while reform opponents cite the cost of oversight and policy changes.
26. Rushin, supra note 24, at 1393, 1398-99.
27. See, e.g., Rich Exner, How Much Cleveland Will Pay to Reform Its PoliceDepartment UnderConsent
Decree, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (June 2, 2015, 1:08 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/index.
ssf/2015/06/how much it will cost clevelan.html (stating the City of Cleveland may end up spending over $55
million over five years to comply with a federal consent decree); Jaquetta White, City's 2015 Budget Includes
$7.3 MillionforNOPDConsent Decree, NEWORLEANS ADVOCATE (Nov. 4,2014,2:16 AM), http://www.theadvocate.com/neworleans/news/politics/article_1ald7489-365e-523b-b35c-4489ead3O6a.html (stating that the
New Orleans consent decree will likely cost around $55 million over five years to enforce).
28. See, e.g., Tylcr Bridges, LegislatureApproves PropertyTax Hike for New Orleans Police& Fire; Now
Heads to Voters, LENS (May 29, 2014, 3:38 PM), http://thelensnola.org/2014/05/29/legislature-approves-property-tax-hike-for-new-orleans-police-now-heads-to-voters; Richard Rainey, Mitch Landrieu Requests a Doubling of Tax Rates for New Orleans Police and Fire, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 1, 2014, 3:57 PM), https://www.
nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/mitch-landrieus-taxhike plan.html.
29. See, e.g., Amanda Haggard, Law Enforcement Complain Body Cameras Will Lead to Costly Records
Requests, NASHVILLE SCENE (Oct. 20, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.nashvillescene.connews/article/I3061734/
law-enforcement-complain-body-cameras-will-lead-to-costly-records-requests (similarly citing the high cost of
complying with open record requests for body-worn camera footage kept on file); Two US Police Departments
Drop Body Cameras Over Costs, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 11, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/policedepartments-drop-body-cameras-costs-160911075457471.html (explaining the high costs of video storage for
body cameras has inspired some departments to rethink their use).

30. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (establishing that a plaintiff in a
§ 1983 case is permitted to recover from a government agency based on the actions of an employee, like a police
officer); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989) (concluding that a municipality may be liable for the
actions ofan employee under § 1983 ifthe municipality acted with deliberate indifference by failing to adequately
train or oversee their employee in a way that contributed to the constitutional rights violation).
31. See Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act as a Blueprint
for Police Reform, 105 CAL. L. REV. 263, 305 (2017) ("Over the last decade, the City of Chicago has paid out a
jaw-dropping $500 million in civil rights settlements, judgments, and legal fees all related to police misconduct.
In 2013 alone, the city paid $84.6 million-more than triple the amount that the city had anticipated in its budgetary projections."); Mercy Yang, Chicago Police Settlements Cost Taxpayers $210 Million Plus Interest,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 14, 2016, 6:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chicago-police-settlement-

misconduct-21 0-million us_5787f6a6e4b03fc3ee500a88.
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Consistency

In a handful of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the need for
regulations of law enforcement to remain relatively consistent or stable over
time. This desire for consistency is perhaps most evident in the Justice Samuel
32
Alito's dissent in Arizona v. Gant. There, police arrested Rodney Gant for driv33
ing with a suspended license. Officers then handcuffed Mr. Gant and locked
him in the back of a patrol car as they searched his vehicle incident to35 arrest
without a warrant.34 Inside, the officers found a gun and a bag of cocaine. Gant
moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search as a violation of his
36
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. in New
York v. Belton, the Court had previously held that police could conduct a warrantless search of a suspect's jacket located inside his vehicle incident to arrest,
3
provided that the jacket was "within the arrestee's immediate control." ' Thus,
the Court in Gant had to determine whether the logic from Belton-which justified the warrantless search of some vehicles incident to arrest-could be extended to a situation where police have handcuffed and locked a suspect in the
back of a squad car.
The majority held that the Fourth Amendment only permits the warrantless
search of an automobile incident to arrest when "(1) the arrestee is within reachreason
ing distance of the vehicle at the time of the search, and (2) the officer has
38
In his
arrest."
of
offense
the
of
evidence
contains
vehicle
the
that
to believe
progits
and
Belton
from
departure
Court's
the
that
worried
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dissent, Justice
to
come
had
police
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doctrine
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shift
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an
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trained
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country
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across
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police
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he
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rely upon.
40
officers to follow the Belton rule. In previous cases, the Court had acknowledged that "a single familiar standard . .. [was] essential to guide police officers." 41 But as Alito lamented, for the majority in Gant, "this seemingly counts
for nothing."4 2 In defending the value of such adherence to stare decisis in other
contexts, at least one justice has gone as far as stating that "[it] is usually the wise

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

556 U.S. 332 (2009).
Id. at 335.
Id. at 335-36.
Id. at 336.
Id.
453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (quoting in part from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).

38. Gant, 556 U.S. at 355. In that case, an officer removed the occupants from a car and placed them under
arrest but did not handcuff them. The officer then proceeded to search the back seat of the automobile and found
drugs.
39. Id. at 361 (labeling this concern as "consistency with later cases" and emphasizing earlier the need for
consistency over time).
40. Id. at 349 ("Belton has been widely taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers have
relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years").

41.
42.

Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-214 (1979)).
Gant, 556 U.S. at 359.
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policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than it be settled right." 4 3
Rapidly or regularly changing rules handed down by courts may have a
particularly negative effect on law enforcement. First, rapidly changing rules
may impose a high cost on law enforcement agencies. Take Gant as an example.
By overruling Belton, the Court shifted from a straightforward policy that permitted police officers to search a suspect's vehicle incident to an arrest to a more
fact-specific rule requiring officers to assess the ability of a suspect to reach into
the vehicle and the type of evidence that may be found inside the vehicle. Even
if this rule more thoroughly protects the Fourth Amendment rights of criminal
suspects, such a change requires the nation's roughly 18,000 federal, state, and
local police agencies" to retrain officers in this new policy. Retraining officers
across the country requires time, money, and coordination. Second, there is also
a risk that the nation's police departments (and their officers) may not be able to
adequately keep up with the law if it changes too frequently. Failure to abide by
rapidly changing rules can have serious consequences-namely evidentiary exclusion, which can contribute to the release of dangerous and guilty suspects.45
Third, and relatedly, rapidly changing laws may contribute to other downstream,
costly consequences. No rule, no matter how carefully crafted, can be easily applied to all different factual situations. As a result, with each rule change, police
departments across the country will be faced with unanswered questions about
how the new rule will apply to factually varied situations. Answering these questions will typically require years of additional experimentation and, in all likelihood, litigation.
3.

Efficacy

Police leaders and courts have frequently expressed concern that external
regulations may also impair officers' ability to fight crime effectively. 46 More
recently, critics have come to describe this as the "de-policing" effect of regulation. 47 We use a somewhat less politically charged term to encapsulate this phenomenon: efficacy.
43.

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

44.

BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

AGENCIES 2008 2 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf
45. For a few examples of this concern, see Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) ("The exclusionary rule generates substantial social costs which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous
at large. We have therefore been cautious against expanding it.. . .") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) ("The principle cost of applying [the exclusionary rule] is, of
course, letting guilty and possible dangerous defendants go free-something that offends basic concepts of the
criminal justice system.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and Bad Ways to Address Police Violence, 48 URB. LAw. 675,

714-25 (2016) (discussing "[t]he [t]hreat of [d]e-[p]olicing").

47. Id. at 721; see also Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing,102 CORNELL L. REV. 721 (2017)
(using the term "de-policing" throughout the paper to describe the rising concern among law enforcement leaders
that regulation causes officers to become less aggressive, thereby contributing to higher crime rates). It seems
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This theory stems from a belief that urban crime is best addressed with
48
"aggressive policing targeting criminogenic hot spots." Criminological research suggests that police may be able to not just displace, but also prevent a
portion of criminal behavior by acting as a deterrent and disrupting situational
incentives. 4 9 Under this theory, when police feel targeted by external regulations,
they may act less aggressively, thereby emboldening criminals and preventing
officers from aggressively policing hot spots in a way that may deter crime. Previous scholars and critics have given this phenomenon a number of different
names, including "passive law enforcement," "selective disengagement," "tacti50
cal detachment," or officer "retreat."
These modem de-policing concerns are hardly new. Although described in
somewhat different terms, critics have long worried that any effort to regulate
police may influence the ability of frontline officers to fight crime. These concerns go back as far as seminal criminal procedure cases like Miranda v. Arizona," when police leaders and politicians predicted that external regulations
would make it more difficult to solve crimes, thereby increasing crime rates.52
Scholars, advocates, and politicians have raised similar concerns after several
53
major cases handed down by the Supreme Court. Similarly, police officers have
expressed concerns about the de-policing effects of federal oversight of police
departments pursuant to § 1441.54 In sum, concerns about the de-policing effects of external regulation have resonated among critics for decades.

that Donald Black and M.P. Baumgartner may have been two of the first academics to use the term "depolicing,"
though they used it to means something slightly different than its intended meaning in later work. Donald Black
& M.P. Baumgartner, On Self-Held in Modern Society, 12 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 33, 34-35 (1987).
48. Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 714 ("These tactics require police to intervene at locations where suspects
are most likely to be armed and involved in unlawful activities in order to increase the risks of facing offenders.").
49. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects ofHot Spots Policingon Crime: An UpdatedSystematic
Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 634-35 (2014) (showing through a meta-analysis of existing research that hot spot policing strategies can produce a small, but noteworthy reduction in crime rates, and showing
that problem-oriented policing strategies can contribute to an even larger decrease in crime).
50. Willard M. Oliver, Depolicing:Rhetoric or Reality?, CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 437,438 (2015) (using
each of these different terminologies).

51.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

52. See, e.g., More Criminalsto Go Free? Effect ofHigh Court'sRuling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June
27, 1966, at 32, 33 (quoting the mayor of Los Angeles at the time as saying that the Miranda decision would
impair police investigations and cause more criminals to go free); Rushin & Edwards, supra note 47, at 732
(describing similar objections by President Nixon and others).
53. Rushin & Edwards, supra note 47, at 732 (describing similar objections by President Nixon and others).
54. See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., VERA INST. JUST., CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING
IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING? 16-21 (2005), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/
Publications/can-federal-intervention-bring-lasting-improvement-in-local-policing-the-pittsburgh-consent-decree/legacydownloads/277_530.pdf (finding that approximately nine out often officers felt that the threat of
community complaints made officers less proactive on the streets, while around eight out often believed that the
federal consent decree impaired their ability to fight crime).
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Participation

Both rank-and-file officers and police leaders have frequently expressed a
desire to participate in the development of regulations. Historically, as Professors
David Sklansky and Monique Marks have explained, "[t]he dominant mindset of
police departments, police reformers, appellate judges, and criminal justice
scholars . . . has been that policing need strong, top-down management."5 5 But
in recent decades, there has been a shift towards more participatory management.
Police leaders have come to recognize the inclusion of rank-and-file officers in
the process of cooperatively developing rules and policies may increase the likelihood that officers accept these regulations as legitimate. For example, Professors L. Song Richardson and Catherine Fisk have argued that the failure to give
officers "any voice" in the development of internal policies may fuel resentment
by communicating how "unimportant their views" are and how "low their status"
is within the department.5 6
5.

Predictability

Another seemingly important procedural value at stake during police regulation is predictability, which we define as the ability of a police officer to predict
how courts will apply rules to factually different situations in the future. Policymakers cannot hand down rules that neatly dictate how police officers should act
in every different factual circumstance. And police work, by definition, is unstructured and requires officers to make split-second decisions on how to apply
legal rules to factually varied situations.5 7 So, it is understandable that police may
have a strong preference for rules that are predictable-or, at minimum, for rules
that provide officers with sufficient notice about their applicability to new factual
situations before holding officers accountable for rule violations.
In practice, courts and policymakers have been fairly sympathetic to the
need for predictability in regulating police conduct. Two of the most prominent
examples of policymakers emphasizing the importance of predictability can be
found in the series of cases delineating the scope of federal criminal liability for
police officer misconduct under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and the limits of the qualified
immunity doctrine under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In criminal cases against police of-

55. David Alan Sklansky & Monique Marks, The Role ofRank and File in Police Reform, 18 POLICING&
Soc'Y 1, 1 (2008).
56. Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 773 (2017).
57. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAw ENF'T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 91-92 (comparing police work to counseling and providing examples of the kind of counseling-type
roles that must adopt). The report also elaborated that, "Policemen deal with people when they are most threatening and most vulnerable, when they are angry, when they are frightened, when they are desperate, when they
are drunk, when they are violent, or when they are ashamed." Id. at 91; see also MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 164 (2d ed. 2010) (recognizing how the
"supervision of subordinates with broad discretion and responsibilities" is particularly difficult, and that it is
nearly impossible to "hold officers accountable for everything all the time.").
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ficers facing charges under § 242, the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly emphasized the importance of giving police officers fair notice of their legal obligations. Under § 242, a state or local police officer is subject to federal criminal
penalties in the event that he or she "under color of law ... willfully subjects any
person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 59 The Supreme Court
interpreted the phrase "willfully" in United States v. Screws60 to require a police
officer to have intentionally violated a person's civil rights in order to sustain a
conviction under the statute. Put differently, a conviction under § 242 requires a
police officer to act in "defiance of announced rules of law" and to know "precisely what [he or she] is doing." 6 ' As the Court explained, this interpretation
ensures that police officers are given "fair warning" so they can predict which
behaviors may result in serious criminal sanctions. 6 2
Relatedly, courts have held that police officers "sued in a civil action for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U.S.C. § 242."63 This desire
to ensure police officers receive fair warning before becoming subject to civil
penalties has contributed to the development of the qualified immunity doctrine.
Under the modem understanding of the qualified immunity doctrine, a victim of
police misconduct cannot hold the officer responsible under § 1983 unless the
officer's conduct violated "clearly established law.'" Thus, only if an officer has
been given sufficient notice that certain conduct would violate the Constitution,
should federal courts allow for victims to recover monetary damages from the
officer.
6.

Safety

Policymakers commonly worry about how external regulations may impair
officer safety-either by limiting the ability of officers to defend themselves
when facing imminent danger, or by inadvertently putting officers in potentially
harmful situations. This concern for officer safety is perhaps more acute in the
series of cases outlining the constitutional limits of officer use-of-force under the
Fourth Amendment.

58. John V. Jacobi, ProsecutingPolice Misconduct, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 789, 814.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). It is worth noting that these cases have been fairly difficult to prove. Jacobi,
supra note 58, at 809-11 (attributing this difficulty to the specific intent requirement established in Screws);
Stephen Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 3189, 3203 (2014) (showing that
the DOJ only investigated around 30-40% of complaints under this statute and brought charges in around 1 or
less percent).

60.
61.
62.

325 U.S. 91, 92 (1945).
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 104; see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997) (also using the phrase "fair

warning").

63.
64.

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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For example, in Graham v. Connor,6 5 the Court considered the constitutional standard for judging whether an officer used excessive force in making an
arrest, investigatory stop, or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 6 The case
stemmed from an incident when a diabetic man, Dethorne Graham, asked his
friend, William Berry, to drive him to a nearby convenient store to purchase orange juice. On the way to the store, Graham "felt the onset of an insulin reaction."67 When the two men entered the store, they found the checkout line to be
too long, so they hastily left.68
Officer Connor became suspicious when he saw the two men enter and
leave the store so quickly, so he began following their automobile. 69 About a
half-mile from the convenient store, Officer Connor made an investigatory
stop. 70 Although Graham explained that he was having a "sugar reaction," the
officer ordered both men to stay in their car while he investigated whether anything had happened at the convenient store.71 As Officer Connor was in his patrol
car, Graham got out of the automobile, "ran around it twice, and finally sat down
on the curb, where he passed out briefly." 72
A number of officers reported to the scene, and, "[i]n the ensuing confusion," one of the officers rolled Graham over and cuffed him with his hands
pulled tightly behind his back.7 3 Berry objected to the officer's treatment of Graham, but the officer responded that he had "seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that never acted like this. Ain't nothing wrong with the [expletive] but
drunk. Lock the [expletive] up." 74 As Graham regained consciousness, he instructed the officers to check for a diabetic decal that he carried in his wallet.75
In response, one of the officers told Graham to "shut up" and shoved his face
against the hood of the vehicle, before a group of officers threw Graham headfirst
into the police car. 76
When the officers confirmed that Graham had done nothing wrong, they
drove him home and released him, but only after he had suffered a broken foot,
cuts on his wrist, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder.77 Graham eventually filed a federal civil rights suit against the individual officers involved in the
altercation, alleging they had used unconstitutionally excessive force.7 Ultimately, the Court in Graham concluded that, in making such a determination,
65. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
66. Id. at 388.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 388-89.
69. Id. at 389.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 389-90.
7R

Id at

390
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courts should examine the objective reasonableness of the officer's actions by
carefully balancing the "'nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests
at stake."7 9 In conducting such a balancing test, courts are permitted to consider
"the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight."80 Thus, the Graham decision explicitly
includes a careful calculation of the effect of any regulation on the safety of the
officer and others. Any rule that would unreasonably imperil the safety of others
appears to be one the Court would view with greater skepticism.
Similarly, in Scott v. Harris, the Court examined whether police officers
could put a fleeing motorist at serious risk of injury or death in order to prevent
that motorist from fleeing in a manner that may be dangerous to nearby bystanders.81 The case started when a Georgia county deputy clocked a suspect traveling
eighteen miles over the speed limit and began pursuit. As the chase continued,
the suspect's speed exceeded eighty-five miles-per-hour. 8 2 At one point, the suspect also evaded officers by colliding with an officer's car as he exited a parking
lot and proceeded down a two-lane highway. 83 About six minutes and ten miles
later in the chase, Deputy Timothy Scott pushed his car's bumper into the rear of
the fleeing vehicle, causing the suspect to lose control of his car, overturn, and
crash into an embankment.8 4 The accident severely injured the suspect, later
identified as Victor Harris, and left him as a quadriplegic.85 Mr. Harris filed suit
against Officer Scott alleging that his use of the car maneuver to end the chase
constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 86 At issue on
appeal was the question of whether Deputy Scott's actions, taken in the light
87
most favorable to Mr. Harris, could constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.
In making this determination, the Court examined the video of the pursuit, and
determined that Mr. Harris was driving in a manner that endangered human life.
Based on this, the Court determined that Deputy Scott did not violate Mr. Harris's Fourth Amendment rights. 8 9
In Scott, the Court independently balanced the nature and quality of the
intrusion against the importance of the governmental interest at stake. 90 In applying this test, the Court concluded that Deputy Scott was justified in pushing
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 396 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
Id.
550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007).
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 375-76.
Id. at 376.

88. Id. at 380 ("Respondent's version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable
jury could have believed him.").

89.
90.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 373 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
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Mr. Harris off the road in order to ensure "public safety." 9 1 Given that Mr. Harris
"posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might
have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the other offices involved
in the chase," Deputy Scott's actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment.92
Thus, the Court in Scott was understandably concerned about the way that
court regulation may impair the ability of police officers to ensure public safety.
In addition to case law, officers have frequently cited concerns about safety when
facing other forms of external regulations on officer use-of-force. 93
Overall, though, there appears to be, both among courts and among police
officers, a genuine concern that external legal regulation may contribute to officers being more hesitant to use necessary force, and further concern that "this
hesitation might end up" causing an officer to be "killed or assaulted." 9 4
7.

Simplicity

Finally, courts and other policymakers have emphasized that police regulations should be sufficiently simple so that law enforcement can easily understand
and apply them to different factual scenarios.95 According to this line of thinking, unclear and complex regulations increase the probability that law enforcement might, even if acting in good faith, misapply rules.
In the Gant case described earlier, Justice Alito emphasized the need for
the Court to create workable rules for police that can be easily applied to different
factual scenarios: "The Belton rule . .. was adopted for the express purpose of
providing a test that would be relatively easy for police officers and judges to
apply." 96 Alito worried that the Court's departure from the Belton rule would
"reintroduce" the exact sort of "case-by-case, fact-specific decisionmaking [sic]"
that it ought to avoid when regulating police. 97
The Court expressed a similar concern in the majority opinion in Atwater
v. City ofLago Vista.9 8 There, a Texas state law permitted police officers to arrest
91.
92.

Id. at 383.
Id. at 384.

93. Approximately 125 officers brought the suit (which represents around 10% of the police force in Seattle). These officers did not have the support of the police union. Interestingly, these officers used crowdsourcing
to get the funding for the suit. Tim Crushing, Seattle Cops CrowdsourcingLegal Battle Against DOJ-Imposed
Excessive Force Remedies, TECH DIRT (Sept. 12, 2014, 9:18 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/201
40910/06201228473/seattle-cops-crowdsourcing-legal-battle-against-doj-imposed-excessive-force-remedies.
shtml.
94. Rushin & Edwards, supranote 47, at 737.
95. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward ReasonableStandardsfor
Law EnforcementAccess to Location Data That CongressCould Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 124 (2012)
(explaining that rules for police ought to be clear and articulable); Stephen Rushin, The Legislative Response to
Mass Police Surveillance, 79 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 4 (2013); Charlie Savage, Judges Divided over Rising GPS
Surveillance,N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/us/14gps.html (Professor Orin
Kerr arguing that police need clear rules).

96.
97.
98.

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 360 (2009).
Id.
532 U.S. 318, 350 (2001).
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offenders who violated traffic laws for failure to wear a seatbelt, even though the
99
punishment for such an offense was a mere fine. In upholding the legality of
the arrest, the Court stressed the importance of "clarity and simplicity" in police
regulations.10O
B.

The Needfor Empirical Research

Research about the relative importance of competing procedural values
during external regulation is important. Courts and policymakers often speak in
vague generalities, with little empirical evidence, about which values matter
most to police. At various times, courts and policymakers have seemingly suggested that police need rules that are simple, consistent, cheap, and predictable.
No doubt, by themselves, each of these may be an important procedural value.
But a rule that enhances one of these procedural values will often do so at the
expense of another important value. Thus, the question is not whether these values are important. Instead, the challenge for policymakers is to determine which
procedural values ought to take precedent when they are in conflict.
Of course, this is a normative question. It requires policymakers to make
political, practical, and moral judgments. One way to assist courts and legislators
in making these difficult decisions is to offer empirical evidence on how relevant
stakeholders in the criminal justice system rank the comparative importance of
these competing values. This is an enormous empirical undertaking, and this Article could not possibly study all relevant stakeholders affected by police regulation. Instead, we have chosen to study one subgroup within this field: police
leaders.
We believe that police leaders are well positioned to provide useful insight
into how police officers across the country rank the relative importance of these
values. Virtually all police leaders have spent years working as rank-and-file officers before moving into management roles. But unlike rank-and-file officers,
police leaders are more likely to have a holistic understanding of how regulations
affect their agencies. For example, leaders within police departments may be
more in tune to the costs that regulations impose on agencies or how they affect
different constituencies within the larger population of rank-and-file officers.
They have regular contact with rank-and-file officers.
We recognize, though, that police leaders may not always be representative
of the entire population of police officers in the United States. We also recognize
that other stakeholders may have drastically different opinions on the relative
importance of these procedural values. This study should serve as the beginning
of a broader exploration of the relative importance of procedural values during
police regulation. Future studies may examine the opinions of rank-and-file officers, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and members of the public.

99.
100.

Id. at 323.
Id. at 347.
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III. METHODOLOGY

The existing literature suggests that courts and policymakers consider a
wide range of procedural values when handing down regulations of American
police departments. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the comparative importance of each of these procedural values to American law enforcement leaders. To do this, our study relies on a survey taken by heads of law enforcement
agencies from across the country conducted in late 2016. The Sections below
describe the administration of the survey and profiles the respondents. It also
provides background on the survey instrument and the timing of the survey administration. Finally, we describe the multidimensional preference-scaling
model used in this study.
A.

Population, Sample, and Respondents

Our survey sought opinions from the population of law enforcement leaders
in the United States.' 01 We defined law enforcement leaders as the head of a law
enforcement agency at either the local, state, or federal level. Admittedly, our
focus on law enforcement leaders does not capture the entire population of American law enforcement officers. There are an estimated 605,000 individuals who
work for local law enforcement agencies alone-the vast majority of which do
not fall into the category of law enforcement leaders. 102 It may be useful for future researchers to survey the entire population of law enforcement officers (or
some subset therein) and examine how the views of law enforcement leaders
differ from others. Similarly, our focus on law enforcement agencies leaves out
many stakeholders in the debate over police regulation, ranging from community
activities, nonprofits, judges, public defenders, prosecutors, to the general public.
This study leaves substantial room for future studies. Nevertheless, we believe
that our survey of law enforcement leaders provides a valuable starting point in
understanding how relevant stakeholders value the comparative importance of
procedural values in police regulation.
One of the first challenges we faced in conducting this survey was identifying a comprehensive list of American law enforcement leaders. This is challenging in part because American law enforcement is remarkably decentralized.
As one commentator put it, "[w]e are not a nation of one police force. We are a
nation of thousands of decentralized police departments."l03 The federal government conducts semiregular surveys of American law enforcement agencies.104 To overcome this challenge, we gained access to a private company's
101. We did not include law enforcement agencies found in U.S. territories and possessions because of their
unique legal status, history, and potentially culture.
102. BRIAN A. REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 2 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpdl3ppp.pdf (showing that
around 477,000 of these individuals are sworn officers).
103. RuSHIN, supra note 23, at 5.
104. REAVES, supra note 102, at 1.
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compilation of all law enforcement agencies in the United States and their respective leaders.10 This directory contained the contact information for nearly
26,000 law enforcement agencies. 06 The number of agencies included in this
commercial database is approximately consistent with the number of agencies
identified by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in its semiregular Census of State
and Local Law Enforcement Agencies. 10 7 This gives us reasonable confidence
that this commercial database represents a fairly complete population of American law enforcement leaders.
A commercial database such as this also comes with some potential benefits. For one thing, the company updates this database annually. This increases
the likelihood that the sampled survey respondents actually receive the survey.
Of course, it is unavoidable that some survey respondents move, retire, or resign
from their position in the time-span between when the contact information is
gathered and when we sent out the survey. Yet, the high response rate of the
survey (discussed in more depth below) suggests that this was rarely the case.
Also, a number of law enforcement agencies contacted us directly either by
phone or email to update the contact information of the current head of their
agency. Finally, in some instances an incoming head of a law enforcement
agency answered the survey for the outgoing leader.
The compilation of contact information included many agencies that are
not engaged in law enforcement-type actions or criminal investigations. We excluded those but retained agencies that complete criminal investigations, turn
those investigations over to prosecutors for enforcement, and are overall substan1 8
tially similar to local law enforcement in their job description.
Once we established a reasonably accurate database of American law en10 9
forcement leaders, we drew a random sample of 2,000 agencies. Law enforcement leaders are typically busy and potentially disinclined to respond to surveys.
As such, the large sample size was meant to increase the likelihood that a sufficiently high number of surveyed law enforcement agencies would respond to the

105.

NAT'L PUB. SAFETY INFO. BUREAU, NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LAw ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATORS

(54th ed. 2018).
106. This database also contained the contact information for a number of individuals that did not necessarily work as a leader of a law enforcement agency. In fact, the overall database included nearly 36,000 individuals. We limited our survey to only individuals who served as leaders of identifiable law enforcement agencies,

which is closer to 26,000 individuals.
107. For example, the 2008 Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies identified nearly 18,000
such agencies in the United States. BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND
LOCAL LAw ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2008 2 (2011). The commercial database included contact information for
leaders from between 21,830 and 22,229 state and local agencies (depending on how you define law enforcement
agencies that serve railroads, airports, and harbors).
108. Appendix A includes the list of types of agencies that are included in the survey. Appendix B lists
agencies that we excluded from the survey.
109. We did not utilize a stratified sample because we had no a priori reason to believe that the sample
would not be well-balanced, and we had no way to determine which groups might provide unduly small numbers
of responses.
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survey. Table 1 provides descriptive information about the population composition, the sample composition, the number of responses received in each category,
and their response rates.
TABLE 1: SURVEY POPULATION, SAMPLE,
RESPONSES, AND RESPONSE RATES
TYPE

POPULATION

SAMPLE

RESPONSES

RATE

Municipal Law
Enforcement
County Law

12,147

1,180

293

24.6

5,801

317

64

20.2

2,145

210

55

26.2

751

62

22

28.2

399

39

7

17.9

1,737

109

30

27.5

1,910

49

14

28.6

1,040

22

3

13.6

381

7

1

14.3

26,311

2,000

489

24.45

Enforcement

Campus Law
Enforcement

Law Enforcement Training

Airport, Harbor,
Railroad Police
State Police &
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The overall response rate of 24.45% is significantly higher than expected.
Of course, we would have preferred a higher response rate, but we do not have
any reason to believe that the response rate incorporates systematic selection biases.
The respondents cover a wide range of department sizes, serving a broad
spectrum of populations, and facing a broad range of challenges. For example,
the population served by survey respondents ranges from less than a thousand to
the millions. The number of sworn officers among responding departments
ranges from one single officer to thousands. Some law enforcement agencies
serve wealthy suburbs and others poor rural counties and urban areas.
Similarly, the responding agencies are spread throughout the nation.'o Figure 1 plots the geographic distribution of survey respondents by their zip codes.
The figure highlights the broad range of survey respondents in keeping with the
simple fact that there are law enforcement agencies throughout the nation. That
being said, demographically denser areas of the country tend to have law en-

110.

Except Alaska. There were respondents from Hawaii, but they are not represented in Figure 1.
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forcement departments in closer geographic proximity to each other, a fact reflected in Figure 1 by the variation in dots between Boston and Washington, D.C.
as compared to the dots between Minneapolis and Portland.
FIGURE 1: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF
SURVEY RESPONDENTS BY ZIP CODES

Figure 1 lends confidence that the survey respondents reflect law enforcement agencies from across the country, ranging from dense Eastern urban cores
to sparsely populated Western counties.
B.

Survey Instrument and Administration

Initially, we attempted to conduct the survey electronically. We emailed a
random sample of law enforcement agency heads, asking them to fill out an
online survey. To increase response rates and protect survey responses, we
hosted the survey on our own servers rather than using a commercial provider.
The response rate for the internet-based survey was abysmal at roughly 3%.
This response rate stands in sharp contrast to the response rate we eventually
received using a paper-based survey."' Given the low response rate on the elec112
tronic survey, we decided to not use any of the data from it.
Instead, we decided to conduct the survey again, this time sending physical
letters to the heads of law enforcement agencies. The letter contained a cover
letter explaining who we are, the nature of the research, an enclosed survey, and
a stamped return envelope. Survey subjects could return anonymous survey responses that did not include their names. This method potentially increased response rates and the truthfulness of the responses.
111. See infra Part H.C.
112. We report our early and unused attempts here to assist future researchers when they decide about how
to structure their research.

No. 5]

POLICE EXECUTIVE OPINIONS OF LEGAL REGULATION

1863

The heart of the survey was a list of values important in police regulation
matters. The survey asked respondents to rank these values from most important
to least important to the agency that he or she administers. The survey instructions did not allow for ties or weighting.' 13 Table 2 provides the list of values
that we chose to include on the survey and brief definitions for each.
TABLE 2: VALUES AND DEFINITIONS AS PROVIDED IN SURVEY TO A RANDOM
SAMPLE OF HEADS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES*

PROCEDURAL VALUE DEFIMTION

CONSISTENCY - Rules established in the past remain in place over
time.
COST - It is not too costly for a police department to comply with the
Rules.
PREDICTABILITY - Police officers can predict how courts will apply
the Rules in different situations in the future.
CITIZEN RIGHTS - The Rules protect citizens from potentially harmful police conduct.
SAFETY - Police officers can abide by the Rules without unduly
reducing their own safety or the safety of others.
SIMPLICITY - The Rules are simple to understand and establish clear
standards.
EFFICACY - The Rules promote effective crime detection and prevention.
PARTICIPATION - The Rules were developed with input from the law
enforcement community.
* In the survey, the order of the values was randomized across respondents.

Of course, the brief definitions of each value are brief and simplistic. We
included the definitions to increase the likelihood that the survey respondents
had similar understandings of what each term meant. Also, keeping definitions
short increased the likelihood that busy agency heads would read and complete
the survey.
The substantive results of this Article must be understood in the context of
trade-offs that are made when conducting a survey. We had to make choices in
how we labeled and framed each procedural value. These framing choices may
have unexpectedly affected or skewed the responses we received from law enforcement leaders. There were likely many different ways that we could have
framed each procedural value. We tried to lessen this concern by testing our survey instrument on a smaller cohort of law enforcement leaders before we submitted it nationally. Based on this test round, we made some minor alterations to
the way we framed the procedural values used in the final survey instrument. We
113.

See infra Appendix C.
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hope that respondents found the final survey instrument to be clear and easily
digestible.
While we attempted to survey the existing literature to identify as many
relevant procedural values as possible, we recognize that our list is certainly not
exhaustive. We could have included a host of other values but decided against
doing so. One of the core reasons for not including more values (or splitting existing values into more subtle shades and differentiations) was to keep the survey
manageable for the survey respondents. Including more than a handful of values
would likely confuse some survey respondents and perhaps lead to arbitrary or
erroneous responses.
We included a sample survey in Appendix C. When administering the survey, we randomized the order of the survey items to reduce the risks that the
order of items could influence the rankings (e.g., that survey respondents systematically pick "cost" over "participation" simply because it appears earlier/later on the survey).
C.

Timing

As with any survey, the timing of the survey administration might affect
outcomes. Short-term deviations caused by momentary and dramatic effects can
obscure the detection of more stable norms.
This possibility is of particular concern in the context of police regulation
matters. A high-profile killing of an on-duty police officer might persuade some
law enforcement leaders to rate values like safety higher than they would under
different conditions. Similarly, an egregious and highly publicized incident of
police misconduct against a civilian may motivate some law enforcement leaders
to rate values like citizens' rights higher than they would under different conditions. Thus, when a law enforcement leader takes the survey may have some
influence on their responses. Unfortunately, in the era of cell phone videos and
body cameras, it is often difficult to find a time when police behavior is not in
the headlines. We made our best efforts to not administer the survey close in time
to any major policing event that received national attention. Nevertheless, we
cannot discount the possibility that some law enforcement leaders' responses
were influenced by local media coverage. Our initial email survey was initiated
in late September of 2016. The physical mail survey was conducted in late November and early December. Participants returned roughly half of all replies to
the survey before the end of 2016, roughly 90% of the surveys were returned
before the end of January 2017, roughly 95% by the end of February, and no
responses arrived after March 2017.
D.

Survey Notables

The survey asked only for the return of the ranked values without any identifying information like addresses or names. However, numerous survey respondents decided to waive anonymity by including their names on the survey
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or by calling on the phone.11 4 Also, some survey respondents included comments and narratives as part of the returned surveys. The comments ranked from
sensible ("Go Sooners!") to nonsensical ("Go Crimson Tide!")." 5
Some comments pointed out important limitations of the survey instrument.
For example, one survey respondent pointed out, "Forced Choice responses do
not allow for true evaluation."" 6 We take this comment to mean that forcing respondents to assign unique values forces respondents to differentiate between
values, even where they might be equal. This comment highlights that the survey
methodology could affect substantive results. We chose to force respondents to
rank values to prevent answers that would in effect say that all values are equally
important. All these values are important, but forcing people to choose between
them nudges respondents to think long and hard about which value they prefer
when push comes to shove. When a situation arises when you have to choose
between cost and simplicity, which one would you choose? Despite instructions
to rank all values uniquely, some survey respondents chose to rank two or more
values at the same rank. Given the survey instructions, such responses are invalid. Still, we ran the following analysis twice. Once we included such "invalid"
responses, and once we did not. The substantive results of these two approaches
are essentially identical. This suggests that, given the question we asked and the
population we contacted, the forced rankings did not drive the substantive conclusions of this Article." 7
Other survey respondents pointed out differences between the surveyed
populations. For example, campus law enforcement officers pointed out that they
are not typical police departments. Similarly, National Park System staff pointed
out that their law enforcement responsibilities are markedly different than typical
police departments and that "many sites within the National Park System, especially small parks, do not have any [explicitly designated] law enforcement
staff.""'8 We are mindful of these and other differences. In fact, our analysis explicitly differentiated (in relevant sections) between different types of law enforcement agencies in an attempt to detect whether differences in mission, locale,
and culture might affect priorities over police regulation values.

114. We did not keep such records to protect the anonymity of the survey responses. Also, one survey
respondent scanned the survey page and emailed it to us rather than returning it by physical mail.
115. On file with authors. Stephen Rushin worked at the University of Alabama School of Law at the time
that we administered the survey.
116. On file with authors.
117. Researchers asking different questions to a different population might want to consider allowing respondents to rank multiple values the same. Alternatively, researchers might want to allow survey respondents
to attach weights to their answers (e.g. ranking cost at 90, and safety at 2, predictability at 1, etc.). This would
allow survey respondents to indicate a magnitude of difference (a huge difference between "cost" and "safety"
in the example above, but only a slight difference between "safety" and "predictability"). We did not choose this
approach because of its complexity. We feared that busy survey respondents might be confused by this approach.
This could lead to lower response rates or erroneous responses.
118. On file with authors.
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Another group of survey respondents included general comments on the
12 0
survey, both good' 19 and bad. Others commented broadly on police regulation
values. For example, one survey remarked that "[o]ur courts are 'random event
generators.' Law enforcement has zero expectation of consistency or predictability, as we've seen a lifetime of judicial activism, five-four decisions, and dramatically changing rules and expectations. We can't wait to see the next poorlyinformed policy du-jour ... ."121 Such comments suggest that survey respondents recognized that the survey asked about values that are salient to them.
E.

Analysis

The survey described above yields for each survey respondent a ranking,
from 1-8, describing which values in police regulations are most and least important to the respondent's agency. For 489 respondents, this leads to 3,912 value
rankings. To analyze, comprehend, and check for the presence or absence of patterns, we must process this data.
We do so in this Article by utilizing a multidimensional preference-scaling
model.1 2 2 The model is analytically attractive because it represents value rankings in a common and intuitive space. We begin by treating each individual survey as a vector pointing in eight-dimensional space. Next, we utilize a leastsquares optimal scaling strategy to arrange values and individual preferences, as
far as possible, so that each vector points to values ranked highly by the respondent and away from values the respondent ranked low.
This process allows us to represent all respondent rankings in one joint
space. The method allows us to reduce the complexity of eight-dimensional
space to any lower-dimensional space (such as three, two, or one dimensions).
As a general rule, more dimensions represent the complexity of higher-dimension space more faithfully than lower-dimensional spaces. However, this improved statistical fit comes at the cost of interpretive difficulty. In the analysis
below, we represent the survey responses in two-dimensional space as a good
compromise between accuracy and ease of use.
119. E.g., "Thank you for the opportunity!" (on file with authors).
120. E.g., "Cannot complete. I have no idea what this survey refers to." (on file with authors).
121. On file with authors (emphasis in original).
122. The method is well explained and utilized elsewhere, so we will keep the explanation short here. For
more thorough accounts, consider SUSAN C. WELLER & A. KIMBALL ROMNEY, METRIC SCALING:
CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS 44-54 (Michael S. Lewis-Beck ed., 1990); Wayne S. DeSarbo & Crystal J. Scott,
MultidimensionalScaling ofPreferenceData, in 2 WILEY INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MARKETING 198
(Jagdish N. Sheth et al. eds., 2010); GORDON G. BECHTEL, MULTIDIMENSIONAL PREFERENCE SCALING (1976);
J.D. Carroll, Individual Diferences in MultidimensionalScaling, in MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (A. Kimball Romney et al., eds., 1972). We conducted our analysis
in R, using, mostly, the SMACOF package. See generallyPatrick Mair et al., Package 'smacof (June 14, 2018),
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/smacof/smacof.pdf; Jan de Leeuw & Patrick Mair, Multidimensional
Scaling Using Majorization: SMACOF in R., J. STATISTICAL SOFTwARE, Aug. 2009, at 1. This Article's approach, presentation, and discussion were inspired by William Jacoby. See William G. Jacoby, Is There a Culture
War? Conflicting Value Structures in American Public Opinion, 108 AM. POL. SC. REV. 754 (2014).
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Perhaps the most intuitive analogy for multidimensional scaling comes
from representations of the solar system. The actual solar system is absurdly
complex, with multiple objects constantly moving in off-plane almost-ellipses
around the sun, constantly affecting and altering each other's trajectories. A
model that incorporates this complexity would not be useful for most purposes.
As a result, the solar system is sometimes represented by a simplified three-dimensional model (familiar from middle school science fairs). Still, that representation is not suitable for printing. As such, two-dimensional models of the solar
system adorn countless books. The two-dimensional model is less accurate than
the three-dimensional model but is useful for many contexts. Also, notice that
the two-dimensional "slice" of the three-dimensional model is typically chosen
that best captures the true orbits. Finally, for discussions that simply focus on the
order of the planets, a one-dimensional representation of the solar system is sufficient. Multidimensional scaling, at heart, formalizes the process of moving
from higher-dimensional spaces to lower-dimensional spaces.
The result of all of this is that hundreds of complex survey responses can
be represented in a single and intuitive figure. Similar respondents cluster together. Respondents that value fundamentally different things are in opposite
sides of the figure. Values that are ranked together appear in physical proximity.
Values that are ranked apart are physically apart. In short, multidimensional scaling simplifies a mountain of data into one figure that represents preferences over
a range of values important in police regulation matters.
IV. FINDINGS

Overall, we found that respondents were most concerned with the ways that
regulation may impair safety. Law enforcement leaders generally ranked citizens' rights as the next most important procedural value. Very few respondents
ranked values like cost, participation, and predictability near the top in comparative importance. This section begins by walking through the distribution of importance rankings for all survey respondents. We then use the multidimensional
preference-scaling model to examine more nuanced trends in the data. Overall,
this analysis reveals there to be remarkable uniformity in the responses by police
leaders across the country, regardless of department type, size, or geographical
location.
A.

InitialDescriptionof Survey Responses

Before discussing the results of the more sophisticated multidimensional
preference-scaling model, it is first useful to look at trends in the raw data.12 3
To do this, Table 3 documents the percentage of respondents that placed
the procedural values in the survey instrument at each ordinal ranking. Some
123. For an example of another empirical study that starts by examining basic trends in raw data before
diving into more advanced analysis, see Rushin & Edwards, supra note 47, at 759.
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clear trends emerge from this relatively straightforward recitation of the data. It
seems that some procedural values rise to the top, while others sink to the bottom
in apparent importance.
A little more than 64% of law enforcement leaders ranked safety as the
most important procedural value-far ahead of citizens' rights, which received
just under 20% of all first-place rankings. No other procedural value received
more than 8% of first-place rankings, with some (like predictability and cost)
receiving less than 1% of first-place ranks. Together, safety and citizens' rights
account for around 84% of all top rankings. On the other end of the results, respondents generally ranked consistency, cost, and predictability as among the
least important procedural values. Around two-thirds of respondents ranked consistency (65.67%) and cost (6.68%) as one of the three least important procedural
values. And more than three-fourths of respondents ranked predictability
(77.96%) similarly low in relative importance.
TABLE

Score

OF IMPORTANCE RANKINGS OF THE PROCEDURAL
24
VALUES FOR ALL VALID SURVEY RESPONDENTS1

3: DISTRIBUTION

Consistency

Cost

Predictability

Citizen
Rights

Safety

Efficacy

Participation

Simplicity

1.86
7.66
16.71
21.58
18.79
16.47
11.37
5.57

7.19
10.44
20.88
19.03
17.87
13.69
6.96
3.94

---------------------------------------------------------------------

---------

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

2.32
1.62
10.21
8.82
11.37
20.42
19.26
25.99

0.46
2.32
4.64
8.58
16.01
15.31
21.35
31.32

0.70
1.62
2.78
7.42
9.51
16.94
32.02
29.00

19.72
40.37
15.78
10.44
6.73
3.94
1.62
1.39

64.04
24.59
5.10
2.78
1.86
0.70
0.70
0.23

3.71
11.37
23.90
21.35
17.87
12.53
6.73
2.55

While this sort of analysis is useful, it fails to answer many important questions. Does a law enforcement leader's high ranking of one procedural value predict how that leader may value other procedural values? For example, when a
law enforcement leader ranks safety or citizens' rights as the most important
value at stake during police regulation, does this ranking predict how she might
rank other procedural values thereafter? Does the type of law enforcement
agency affect the responses of the law enforcement leader? For example, we may
expect sheriffs or federal law enforcement leaders to rank the values differently
than municipal law enforcement leaders. Do geography, department size, or
other demographic differences affect responses by law enforcement leaders?

124. Note: "1" indicates most important, "8" indicates least important. Each cell entry indicates the percentage of survey respondents who ranked a value in a given rank. Only valid responses were included in this table.

No. 5]

POLICE EXECUTIVE OPINIONS OF LEGAL REGULATION

1869

Unfortunately, it is difficult to answer these sorts of questions using a simple analysis like that in Table 3. Doing so would require us to reproduce potentially dozens of tables comparing how various factors influence the rankings
given by police leaders. Instead, in the subsections that follow, we use a multidimensional preference-scaling model to examine more complex trends in the
data.
B.

InitialModel

Our first model, displayed as Figure 2, provides a two-dimensional scaling
of the value rankings from Table 3. The model shows the most highly ranked
response from Table 3 (safety) nearest to the center of the figure. The procedural
values are shown as solid circles. Moving outwards from the center of Figure 2,
responses become lower ranked. The arrow represents a vector showing the mean
of all survey responses when averaged together (-10.85 degrees from the top,
pointing upwards). This vector represents the most "typical" preference ordering
by survey respondents. The open circles at the periphery are scaled responses
from individual survey respondents. They have been normalized and jittered to
de-clutter the figure and aid in the interpretation. This changes the length of the
individual vectors but not the orientation. As such, it has no substantive effect on
the interpretation.
One clear pattern emerges from this data. There is remarkable uniformity
among the responses. Law enforcement leaders most frequently placed safety
first, followed by citizens' rights. When respondents did not rank safety first,
they typically ranked citizens' rights first, followed by safety.1 2 5 The overall
trend is clear-law enforcement across the country showed uniformity in their
general responses to our survey-at least at the top.

125. As illustrated by the clustering of open circles near the top left and top right on the periphery of the
figure, survey respondents largely clumped two patterns. We tried but were unable to detect any other sort of
systematic explanation for this clumping.
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FIGURE 2: Two-DIMENSIONAL SCALING OF VALUE RANKINGS
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While Figure 2 demonstrates remarkable consistency in the responses
across the field of American law enforcement leaders, it leaves open many important empirical questions. For example, does the type of department affect the
responses given by law enforcement leaders? Do municipal law enforcement
leaders rank procedural values differently than sheriffs, federal law enforcement
leaders, or university police leaders? Does geographical location influence the
type of responses given by law enforcement leaders? Or does the size of the department have any effect on rankings given to these procedural values? The Sections that follow address these questions in turn.
C.

The Effect ofDepartment Type on Ranking

It seems theoretically plausible that departmental type may influence the
responses from police leaders. To test whether department type is correlated with
changes in survey responses, Figure 3 uses the same multidimensional preference-scaling model to examine the clustering of responses according to department type. Again, the lines are the mean direction vectors for all survey responses
with each type of department. Yet, the various departments are clustered too
close together to allow for clear labeling. The liness represent, starting on the left
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and going counter-clockwise, the following: National Park Services, Law Enforcement Training, Sheriff Departments, Police Departments, State Police Departments, U.S. Marshalls, Campus Law Enforcement, Transit Police (Air, Water, Rail).
FIGURE 3: Two-DIMENSIONAL SCALING OF VALUE RANKINGS
BY DEPARTMENT TYPE
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Figure 3 shows remarkable consistency in the answers given by police leaders regardless of the type of department they oversee. Virtually all law enforcement leaders across all different types of agencies ranked these values the same
as the sample as a whole. Any minor variation appears to be statistical noise,
rather than a measurable difference in responses.
D.

The Effect of GeographicalLocation on Rankings

It also seems possible that the geographical location of the respondents may
have influenced their answers. Again, Figure 4 uses this multidimensional preference-scaling model to look for any clustering of responses according to geographical region. Each line represents departments located in different areas of
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the country. Labels have been removed to avoid clutter. The line on the left represents departments from the Midwest, followed, going counter-clockwise by
departments from the Northeast, South, Southeast, and West.
FIGURE 4: Two-DIMENSIONAL SCALING OF VALUE RANKINGS BY REGION
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There appears to be no major difference in responses based on the geographical location. Respondents from all regions in the United States provided
nearly identical responses.
E.

The Effect of DepartmentSize on Rankings

Finally, we may expect the size of a law enforcement agency to affect the
relative importance given to each procedural value by its leader. For example,
smaller police departments may be more adversely affected than larger police
departments by the upfront or fixed costs of implementing external police regulation. If this were the case, we may expect leaders of smaller police departments
to rate values like cost as relatively more important than their peers in larger
police departments. Alternatively, we expect larger police departments to be located in larger metropolitan areas with more politically progressive populations
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that place a higher value on citizens' rights. Thus, it may be that leaders from
these larger agencies are more likely to value citizens' rights than smaller agencies.
To test the relationship between department size and rankings, Figure 4
mirrors the earlier figures, but with vectors that represent (from left to right) departments with more than (1) 1,000 sworn officers, (2) between 101 and (3) 1,000
sworn officers, (4) 11-100 sworn officers, and (5) fewer than 10 sworn officers.
FIGURE 5: TWO-DIMENSIONAL SCALING OF VALUE RANKINGS
BY SIZE OF DEPARTMENT
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Unlike the previous figures, Figure 5 reveals some separation. It appears
that larger departments in our sample, or those with at least 1,000 sworn officers,
offered somewhat different answers than their peers in smaller departments. On
the whole, our data suggests that officers in larger departments were more likely
to rank cost and efficacy higher than their counterparts elsewhere. But we have
little confidence in the accuracy of this finding. There are simply too few departments of this size in the US, and even fewer in our sample that responded to our
survey, to reach any strong conclusions. As such, we have little confidence that

1874

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2018

orientation of the leftmost line indicates that large department are reliably different from smaller departments.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

Our findings suggest that police leaders are primarily concerned about the
effects of police regulation on safety. Our results also indicate that police leaders
recognize the comparative importance of protecting constitutional rights, even if
doing so may risk crime prevention efforts. Finally, the results also demonstrate
that policymakers may have previously overestimated the extent to which police
are concerned about the cost, predictability, or consistency of legal regulations.
These findings have several implications for the study of police accountability
and criminal procedure.
First, these findings suggest that policymakers should take seriously the
potential effects of external police regulations on officer safety. Courts and legislators may be wise to frame and administer police regulations in a way that
reflects concern for this deeply held belief. Organizational and policing literatures have long argued that, while organizational reform requires "strategic planning, reorganization, reallocation of resources, recruitment and training of staff,"
arguably the most important ingredient for successful reform is the receptivity of
employees and those most affected by the reform efforts.1 2 6 Doing so may increase the likelihood that police will accept legal regulations as legitimate. Further, if American police widely and uniformly perceive there to be a trade-off
between safety and constitutional rights, this should serve as a call for academics
to conduct more rigorous empirical evaluations of the link between police regulation and safety.
Second, the survey results also have important lessons for the ongoing depolicing debate. The comparatively high ranking given to the protection of constitutional rights ahead of values like crime prevention indicates that American
police leaders appreciate the importance of constitutional policing--even if it
may require compromising efforts to combat street crime. Over the last several
years, critics have loudly claimed that efforts to regulate police misconduct may
impair the ability of police officers to fight crime effectively. 12 7 One of the obvious questions, then, is whether this belief is widespread among American law
enforcement. The data from this survey provides at least some insight into this
question. It appears that efficacy-the variable we used to signify the relationship between regulation and crime control-was among the most salient values
across American police leaders. Nevertheless, police leaders generally ranked
126. John K. Cochran, Max L. Bromley & Matthew J. Swando, Shenris Deputies'Receptivity to Organizational Change, 25 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRATEGY & MGMT. 507,507 (2002) (citing Terry L. Amburgey,
Dawn Kelly & William P. Barnett, Resetting the Clock- The Dynamics of OrganizationalChange and Failure,
38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 51 (1993)). Of course, we cannot definitively say whether the opinions of police leaders are
representative of all rank-and-file officers.
127. See, e.g., Mary Kay Mallonee & Eli Watkins, DOJ Scaling Back Program to Reform Police Departments, CNN (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/15/politics/doj-police-program/index.html.
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this value as secondary to the importance of protecting citizens' rights. Thus, our
survey data suggests that, when in conflict, many police leaders in the United
States may prefer that regulations protect civil rights, even if that means somewhat reducing the ability of police officers to fight crime aggressively.
Of course, opinions on this issue may vary among the wider field of American law enforcement. One regrettable, but unavoidable limitation of this study,
is that it only surveyed the field of law enforcement leaders. Rank-and-file officers may be more inclined to worry about the effect of external police regulation
on crime fighting efforts. They may also argue that they are better positioned to
evaluate the relationship between regulation and efficacy than their peers in management positions. More research may be useful to explore how the opinions of
management differ from those of rank-and-file officers on this issue. But one
thing appears clear from our data: despite the heated and sometimes hyperbolic
rhetoric that enters the national discussion about police regulation, many law enforcement leaders, just like civil rights advocates, claim to take the protection of
constitutional rights seriously.
Third, the low rankings given to values like cost, predictability, and consistency should serve as a reminder to policymakers that our assumptions about
police regulation are not always accurate. Policymakers have previously predicted that all three of these values were of particular importance to police leaders. 128 While we do not doubt that all three of these values may matter to some
extent to police leaders, we can say with some certainty that they rank near the
bottom relative to the other procedural values identified in our survey instrument.
So why is this?
We have a few hypotheses. For one thing, the relatively low ranking given
to cost may be the result of police leaders being insulated from the costs imposed
by external regulations. In other contexts, policing scholars have recognized that
the organization of local government structurally and organizationally separates
the police leaders from the real costs imposed by regulatory mechanisms like
civil judgments. As Professor Samuel Walker and Morgan Macdonald previously observed, in many governments, "one agency of government, the police
department, commits abuses of rights, another agency, the city attorney's office,
defends the conduct in court, and a third agency, the city treasurer, pays whatever
financial settlements results from that litigation."1 29 Thus, it may be that the typical police leader rates cost fairly low relative to other values because their department may not directly internalize the costs of regulation.
Additionally, the relatively low ranking given to predictability suggests that
police leaders are more comfortable with ambiguity than some observers previously assumed. There are many plausible reasons why this may be the case. Ambiguous rules may increase police power, which may be appealing to police leaders. When rules are ambiguous, police officers may have the ability to read them
128. Id.
129. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State
"Patternor Practice" Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 479, 495 (2009).
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expansively until policymakers have instructed them otherwise.1 3 0 This is particularly true because of the way that courts implement the qualified immunity
doctrine. Unless an officer's conduct violates "clearly established law," qualified
immunity protects that officer from civil liability under § 1983.131 When it remains unclear how exactly a rule will apply to a future set of factual circumstances, the officer is generally protected from civil suit, as there is no "clearly
established law."l 3 2 So, rather than making police officers jobs more difficult,
the qualified immunity doctrine may mitigate some of the negative side-effects
of unpredictable regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION

Across the country, communities are demanding that police become more
accountable to the populations they serve, and the movement for police accountability shows no signs of letting up. As policymakers attempt to develop new
regulations of police behavior, it is important that they not lose sight of the difficult compromises inherent in such regulation. At all levels of government, policymakers are currently crafting police regulations that require them to make
value judgments-to regulate police behavior in a way that may promote one
value at the expense of another. Before doing so, policymakers would be wise to
understand the perspectives of stakeholders most affected by those regulations.
As this Article demonstrates, law enforcement leaders across the United
States harbor serious concerns about the effect of regulation on safety. Nevertheless, these same leaders also recognize the importance of protecting constitutional rights, even if doing so impedes some crime prevention efforts. And our
data suggests, courts and legislators may have overestimated the extent to which
police demand consistent, predictable, and low-cost rules. These findings should
have important implications to the doctrinal underpinnings of future criminal
procedure cases.
It is important to remember, though, that police leaders are one of many
constituencies affected by police regulation. It would be helpful for future researchers to replicate the methodology in this Article to examine the comparative
importance of these values in the minds of other stakeholders, including rankand-file officers, judges, and members of the general public. By carefully considering how stakeholders normatively rank the relative importance of these values, policymakers in the future can craft regulations that effectively balance the
compromises required by constitutional police regulation. In politically contentious times, when the rhetoric surrounding police regulation frequently runs
shrill, careful empirical work on this balance can help to provide a foundation
for more nuanced commentary, doctrinal scholarship, court opinions, and legislation.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TYPES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES INCLUDED IN SURVEY

Airport Police Departments
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
Campus Law Enforcement
City Sheriffs
Conservation Law Enforcement
County Police Departments
Diplomatic Security Service
Federal Bureau of Investigations
Federal Protective Service
Financial Crimes Enforcement
Harbor Police Departments
Homeland Security Investigations
Law Enforcement Training (**)
Military Law Enforcement Agencies
National Park Service
Police Departments
Railroad Law Enforcement
Sheriffs Departments
State Capitol Police
State Criminal Investigation
State Police/Highway Patrols
U.S. Border Patrols
U.S. Capitol Police
U.S. Immigration & Customs
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
U.S. Marshals Service
U.S. Secret Service
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APPENDIX B: TYPES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES EXCLUDED IN SURVEY

Adult Institutions
Adult Probation & Parole
Attorneys General
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Child Support Enforcement
Citizenship & Immigration
Coroners & Medical Examiners
Corporation for National & Community Service
Councils & Commissions
County Attorney/Coroner
County Jails
County Jails (covered by Sheriff)
Courts of Appeal
District Courts
Enforcement & Removal (ERO)
Environmental Protection Agency
Executive Office of the President
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Federal Correctional Institutions
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Railroad Administration
General Services Administration
Governors
Hazardous Materials Safety
Headquarters
Internal Department Heads
Internal Revenue Service
Juvenile Probation & Parole
Law Enforcement Associations (**)
Management
Military Installations & Bases
Military Law Enforcement Agencies (**)
Miscellaneous State Agencies
Motor Vehicle Division Authorities
Municipal Leagues
National Institute of Justice
National Security Agency
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Office of Intelligence & Analysis
Office of Domestic Preparedness
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Office of Air & Marine Operations
Office of Field Operations
Office of Homeland Security
Office of Internal Affairs
Ports of Entry
Probation & Pretrial Services
Prosecutors
Related Associations
Science & Technology
Secretaries of State
Sheriff/Coroner
State Homeland Security Contacts
State Law Enforcement Associations
Strategic National Stockpile Programs
Transit Authorities
Transportation Security Administration
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
U.S. Attorneys
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Consumer Protection Safety Commission
U.S. Courts
U.S. Department of Agriculture
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Education
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development
U.S. Department of the Interior
U.S. Department of the Treasury
U.S. Department of Transportation
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
U.S. Forest Service
U.S. Government Printing Office
U.S. Postal Service
U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Women's Institutions
Youth Institutions
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APPENDIX C: SAMPLE SURVEY INSTRUMENT
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APPENDIX D: EXPANDED MODEL WITH SAFETY
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APPENDIX E: EXPANDED MODEL WITHOUT SAFETY
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